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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports on the results of a prospective implementation of methods for detecting
teacher cheating. In Spring 2002, over 100 Chicago Public Schools elementary classrooms were
selected for retesting based on the cheating detection algorithm. Classrooms prospectively identified
as likely cheaters experienced large test score declines. In contrast, classes that had large test score
gains on the original test, but were prospectively identified as being unlikely to have cheated,
maintained their original gains. Randomly selected classrooms also maintained their gains. The
cheating detection tools were thus demonstrated to be effective in distinguishing between classrooms
that achieved large test-score gains as a consequence of cheating versus those whose gains were the
result of outstanding teaching. In addition, the data generated by the implementation experiment
highlight numerous ways in which the original cheating detection methods can be improved in the
future.
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Most large urban school districts in the United States suffer from low test scores, high 
dropout rates, and frequent teacher turnover.  In response to these concerns, the last decade has 
seen an increasing emphasis on high-stakes testing.  While there is evidence such testing has been 
associated with impressive gains in test scores in some instances (Jacob 2002, Grissmer et. al. 
2000), critics have argued that these gains are artificially induced by “teaching to the test.”  
Indeed, much of the observed test score gain has been shown to be test-specific, not generalizing to 
other standardized tests that seemingly measure the same skills (Jacob 2002, Klein et. al. 2000).   
Even more ominous is the possibility that the emphasis on high-stakes testing induces cheating on 
the part of students, teachers, and administrators. 
 Jacob and Levitt (2002) develop a method for detecting cheating by teachers and 
administrators on standardized tests.  The basic idea underlying that method (which is described in 
greater detail in Section II) is that cheating classrooms will systematically differ from other 
classrooms along a number of dimensions.  For instance, students in cheating classrooms are likely 
to experience unusually large test score gains in the year of the cheating, followed by unusually 
small gains or even declines in the following year when the boost attributable to cheating 
disappears.  Just as important as test score fluctuations, however, as an indicator of cheating, are 
tell-tale patterns of suspicious answer strings, e.g. identical blocks of answers for many students in 
a classroom, or cases where students are unable to answer easy questions correctly, but do 
exceptionally well on the most difficult questions.  Jacob and Levitt 
(2002) conclude that cheating occurs in 3-5 percent of elementary school classrooms each year in 
the Chicago Public Schools (CPS).
Most academic theories, regardless of their inherent merit, fail to influence policy or do so 
only indirectly and with a long lag.  In this paper, we report the results of a rare counterexample to  
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this familiar pattern involving collaboration between the CPS and the authors of this paper.  At the 
invitation of Arne Duncan, CEO of the Chicago Public Schools, we were granted the opportunity 
to work with CPS administration to design and implement auditing and retesting procedures 
implementing the tools developed in Jacob and Levitt (2002).  Using that cheating detection 
algorithm, we selected roughly 120 classrooms to be retested on the Spring 2002 Iowa Test of 
Basic Skills (ITBS) that was administered to students in third to eighth grade.  The classrooms 
retested include not only cases suspected of cheating, but also classrooms that had achieved large 
gains but were not suspected of cheating, as well as a randomly selected control group.  As a 
consequence, the implementation also allowed a prospective test of the validity of the tools 
developed by Jacob and Levitt. 
The results of the retesting provided strong support for the effectiveness of the cheating 
detection algorithm.  Classrooms suspected of cheating experienced large declines in test scores 
when retested under controlled conditions.  In contrast, classrooms not suspected of cheating a 
priori maintained almost all of their gains on the retest.  The results of the retests were used to 
launch investigations of twenty-nine classrooms.  While these investigations have not yet been 
completed, it is expected that disciplinary action will be brought against a substantial number of 
teachers, test administrators, and principals. 
Finally, the data generated by the auditing experiment provided a unique opportunity for 
evaluating and improving the cheating detection techniques.  The cheating algorithm was 
developed without access to multiple observations for the same classrooms.  By observing two 
sets of results from the same classroom (one from the original test and a second from the retest), 
we are able for the first time to directly evaluate the predictive power of the various elements of 
the algorithm.  The results suggest improvements to the ad hoc functional form assumptions used in  
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the original research, and also suggest that some of our indicators are much better predictors than 
others.  By changing the weights used in the algorithm, we should be able to substantially improve 
the predictive value of the model in future implementations. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II presents background 
information on teacher cheating and the detection methods.  Section III outlines the design and 
implementation of the retesting procedure.  Section IV reports the results of the retests.  Section V 
uses the data from the retests to analyze the predictive value of the various components of the 
algorithm and identifies a number of improvements to the methods.  Section VI concludes. 
 
Section II: Background on teacher cheating and its detection 
The emphasis placed on standardized tests in elementary and secondary education has been 
steadily increasing over the past decade.  The recent federal reauthorization of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which requires states to test students in third through eighth 
grade each year and to judge the performance of schools based on student achievement scores, is 
just one prominent example of this trend.  Prior to the passage of that law, every state in the 
country except for Iowa already administered state-wide assessment tests to students in elementary 
and secondary school.  Twenty-four states require students to pass an exit examination to graduate 
high school.  In the state of California, a policy providing for merit pay bonuses of as much as 
$25,000 per teacher in schools with large test score gains was recently put into place. 
Critics of high-stakes testing argue that linking incentives to performance on standardized 
tests will lead teachers to substitute away from other teaching skills or topics not directly tested on 
the accountability exam (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).  Studies of districts that have 
implemented such policies provide mixed evidence, suggesting some improvements in student  
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performance along with indications of increased teaching to the test and shifts away from non-
tested areas.2  
A more sinister behavioral distortion is outright cheating on the part of teachers, 
administrators, and principals such as erasing student answers and filling in the correct response 
or telling students the answers.3  While the idea of elementary school teachers manipulating 
student answer sheets may seem far-fetched, cheating scandals have been appeared in many places 
including California (May 2000), Massachusetts (Marcus 2000), New York (Loughran and 
Comiskey  1999), Texas (Kolker 1999), and Great Britain (Tysome 1994).  Jacob and Levitt 
(2002) provide the first systematic analysis of teacher cheating.4  We argue in that paper that 
cheating classrooms are likely to share three characteristics: (1) unusually large test score gains 
for students in the class the year the cheating occurs, (2) unusually small gains the following year 
for those same students, and (3) distinctive patterns of Asuspicious@ answer strings. 
                                                 
2. See, for example, Deere and Strayer (2001), Grissmer et. al. (2000), Heubert and Hauser 
(1999), Jacob (2001, 2002), Klein et. al. (2000), Richards and Sheu (1992), Smith and Mickelson 
(2000), and  Tepper (2001). 
3.  As a shorthand, we refer to this behavior simply as teacher cheating, although in using this 
terminology we are by no means excluding cheating by administrators and principals. 
4.  In contrast, there is a well-developed literature analyzing student cheating (e.g., Aiken 1991, 
Angoff 1974, Frary, Tideman, and Watts 1977, van der Linden 2002).  
The first two characteristics above relating to test scores are straightforward.  Large 
increases are expected in cheating classrooms because raising test scores is the very reason for the  
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cheating.  Unlike gains associated with true learning, however, one expects no persistence in the 
artificial test score gains due to cheating.  Thus, if the children in cheating classrooms this year are 
not in cheating classes next year, one expects the full magnitude of the cheating-related gain to 
evaporate the following year. 
Establishing what factors signify suspicious answer strings is more complicated.  Teachers 
may cheat in a variety of ways.  The crudest, most readily detected cheating involves changing 
answers in a block of consecutive questions to be identical for many or all students in a classroom. 
 From the teacher’s perspective, this is the quickest and easiest way to alter test forms.  A slightly 
more sophisticated type of cheating involves changing the answers to non-consecutive questions in 
order to avoid conspicuous blocks of identical answers.  An even cleverer teacher may change a 
few answers for each student, but be careful not to change the same questions across students. 
We utilize for separate suspicious string measures to try to detect all of these varieties of 
cheating. 5  All four of our indicators are based on deviations by students from the patterns of 
answers one would expect the students themselves to generate.  Thus, the first step in analyzing 
suspicious strings is to estimate the probability each child would give a particular answer on each 
question.  This estimation is done using a multinomial logit framework with past test scores, 
demographics, and socio-economic characteristics as explanatory variables.  Past test scores, 
particularly on the same subject test, are very powerful predictors of the student answers on the 
current test. 
                                                 
5. For the formal mathematical derivation of how each of the cheating indicators are constructed, 
see Jacob and Levitt (forthcoming). 
The first suspicious string indicator used is a measure of how likely it is that, by chance,  
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the single most unusual block of identical answers given by any set of students in the class on any 
consecutive set of questions would have arisen.  This cheating indicator maps directly into the 
most naive form of cheating highlighted above, but may not adequately identify more sophisticated 
types of cheating, which are addressed by our second and third measures.  The second indicator 
measures the overall degree of correlation across student answers in a classroom.  A high degree 
of correlation may indicate cheating, since the cheating is likely to take the form of changing 
haphazardly incorrect answers to shared correct answers.  The third indicator captures the cross-
question variation in student correlations.  If a classroom has a few questions in which the 
correlation in student answers are quite high, but the degree of correlation across students in the 
classroom on other questions is unremarkable, this potentially suggests intervention on the part of 
the teacher on the questions in which answers are highly correlated.  The fourth and final 
suspicious string indicator measures the extent to which students in a classroom get the easy 
questions wrong and the hard questions correct.  In other words, by comparing the responses given 
by a particular student to all other students who got the same number of correct answers on that 
test, we are able to construct an index of dissimilarity in the answers each student gives. 
In order to construct an overall summary statistic measuring the degree of suspiciousness of 
a classroom’s answers, we rank order the classes from least to most suspicious within subject and 
grade on each of the four individual measures.  We then take the sum of squared ranks as our 
summary statistic.  By squaring these ranks, greater emphasis is put on variations in rank in the 
right-hand tail (i.e., the most suspicious part) of the distribution.  A parallel statistic is constructed 
for the two test-score gain measures corresponding to this year’s gain and the following year’s 
gain for students in the class. 
Although skepticism about the ability of these indicators to identify cheating might seem  
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warranted, Jacob and Levitt (2002) present a wide range of evidence supporting the argument that 
these measures have predictive power empirically.  For instance, among classrooms that have 
large test score gains this year, children in classrooms that have of suspicious answer strings do 
much worse on standardized tests the following year.  This suggests that big test score gains that 
are not accompanied by suspicious answer strings represent real learning (which partially persists 
to the following year), whereas large test score gains accompanied by suspicious strings are likely 
to be due to cheating.  Also, there tends to be strong correlations across subjects within a 
classroom, within classrooms over time in the incidence of our cheating indicators.  That result is 
consistent with a subset of teachers who tend to cheat repeatedly.  Third, the apparent cheating is 
highly correlated with the set of incentives that are in place.  For example, cheating is more likely 
to occur in low-achieving schools that face the risk of being put on probation, and when social 
promotion is ended, cheating increases in the affected grades.  Perhaps the most convincing 
evidence of the usefulness of the cheating indicators, however, is visual. Figure 1 presents a graph 
in which the horizontal axis reflects how suspicious the answer strings are in a classroom and the 
vertical axis is the probability that students in a classroom experience an unusually large test score 
gain in the current year followed by an unexpectedly small increase (or even a decline) in the 
following year.6  Up to roughly the 90th percentile on suspicious strings and even higher, there is 
little or no relationship between the frequency of large test score fluctuations and suspicious 
strings in this subset of the data.  Based on these data, if one were to predict what the pattern in the 
rest of the data would likely be, a continued flat line might be a reasonable conjecture.  In 
                                                 
6.  More precisely, to qualify as having large test score fluctuations in this figure, a classroom 
must be in the top 5 percent of classrooms with respect to the magnitude of the current year’s 
increase relative to the following year’s decrease.  
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actuality, however, there is a dramatic spike in the frequency of large test score fluctuations for 
classrooms that have very suspicious answers, as evidenced in the right-hand tail of Figure 1.  Our 
interpretation of this striking pattern is that the enormous increase in unexpected test score 
fluctuations in the right-hand-side of the figure reflects the fact that teacher cheating increases the 
likelihood of suspicious strings and of large test score jumps.  In Jacob and Levitt (2002), we 
formally demonstrate that under a set of carefully articulated assumptions, the area under the curve 
in Figure 1 above the projection one would make based on observing the left-hand portion of the 
figure captures the overall incidence of teacher cheating.  Empirically, our findings imply that as 
many as 5 percent of the classrooms in CPS show evidence of cheating on the ITBS in any given 
year. 
-----Figure 1 about here----- 
 
Section III: Implementation of the cheating detection algorithm in the Spring 2002 ITBS testing 
Each Spring, roughly 100,000 CPS students take the ITBS test.  The results of this test 
determine (1) which schools will be placed on academic probation or reconstituted, (2) which 
students will be required to attend summer school and potentially be retained (3
rd, 6
th, and 8th 
grade only), and (3) what students are eligible to apply to the most sought after test-based magnet 
high schools in the CPS system (7
th grade). 
The accountability department CPS conducts retests of the ITBS in roughly 100 classrooms 
annually for the purpose of quality assurance.  The retests, which use a different version of the 
exam, occur 3-4 weeks after the initial testing.  Specially trained staff in the accountability office 
administers the retests.  Unlike the initial round of testing, which is subject to relatively lax 
oversight and control and potentially affords a variety of school staff access to the test booklets,  
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the retest answer sheets are closely guarded.  Up until the last few years, classrooms were 
randomly selected for retests.7  In recent years, retests have been focused on those classrooms 
achieving the largest test score gains relative to the prior year.  Formal investigations have been 
undertaken when major discrepancies arise between the official testing and the retest, but 
punishment is extremely rare.  We are aware of only one instance in the last decade in which 
disciplinary actions have been taken in CPS as a consequence of teacher cheating on ITBS.  
In Spring 2002, Arne Duncan (CEO of the CPS), having read our earlier work on teacher 
cheating, invited us to work with the staff of CPS in selecting the classrooms to be retested.  The 
only real constraint on the implementation of the audits was that budget limitations restricted the 
total number of classrooms audited to be no more than 120.  It is important to note that our earlier 
research on cheating estimated that there were roughly 200 classrooms cheat each year in CPS.  
Thus, the budget constraint meant that we were able to audit only a fraction of suspected cheaters. 
Selecting individual classrooms with the goal of prospectively identifying cheating raised 
an important issue since our original cheating detection method developed in Jacob and Levitt 
(2002) relies heavily on availability of the following year’s test scores (to determine whether 
large test score gains in the current year are purely transitory as would be suspected with 
cheating).  In selecting classrooms to retest, however, next year’s test scores did not yet exist.  As 
a consequence, the choice of classes to audit could depend only on test scores from the current and 
previous years, as well as suspicious answer strings this year. 
                                                 
7.  The exception to this rule was that if credible accusations of cheating were made about a 
classroom, that classroom would be retested with certainty.  
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Table 1 lays out the structure of the implementation scheme that was developed.  
Classrooms to be audited were divided into five separate categories.  The first set of classrooms 
exhibited both unusually large test score gains and highly suspicious patterns of answer strings.  
These classrooms were a priori judged to be the most likely to have experience cheating.  A 
second group of classrooms had very suspicious answer string patterns, but did not have unusually 
large test score gains.  That pattern is consistent with a bad teacher who failed to adequately teach 
the students and attempted to cover up this fact by cheating.  Thus, these classrooms were a priori 
suspected of high rates of cheating.  A third set of classrooms were those for which anonymous 
allegations of cheating were made to CPS officials.  There were only four such classrooms.  It is 
worth noting that none of these four classes accused of cheating would have otherwise made the 
cutoff for inclusion in our first two groups of suspected cheaters.  The remaining two types of 
classrooms audited were not suspected of cheating, but rather, served as control groups. One set of 
controls were classrooms with large test score gains, but answer string patterns that did not point 
to cheating.  These classrooms were judged as likely to have good teachers, capable of generating 
big test score gains without resorting to devious means.8  As such, they provide an important 
comparison group to the suspected cheaters with large gains.   A fifth and final set of classrooms 
were randomly chosen from all remaining classrooms.  These classrooms are also unlikely to have 
high rates of cheating. 
-----Table 1 about here ----- 
 
With the exception of the anonymous tips and the randomly chosen group, we did not 
                                                 
8.  Alternatively, these classes may have had cheating, but of a form that our methods failed to 
detect.  
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employ a hard and fast cutoff rule for allocating classrooms into the various categories.  In order to 
be assigned to the first or second category, a classroom generally needed to be in the top few 
percent of classrooms on suspicious answer strings on at least one subject test.  For category 1, the 
classroom also typically had to be in the top few percent on test score gains.  In cases where 
multiple subject tests had elevated levels of suspiciousness, these cutoffs were sometimes relaxed. 
 In addition, some classrooms that appeared suspicious, but otherwise would not have made it into 
categories 1 or 2, were included because other classrooms in the same school did qualify and we 
were interested in isolating school-wide instances of cheating.  
Dividing classrooms to be audited in this manner provides two benefits.  First, the 
presence of two control groups (the randomly selected classrooms and the rooms with large 
achievement gains but that did not have suspicious answer strings) allows a stronger test of the 
hypothesis that other classrooms are cheating.  In the absence of these control groups, one might 
argue that large declines in the retest scores relative to the initial test in suspected cheating 
classrooms is due to reduced effort on the part of students on the retest.9  By isolating a set of 
classrooms that made large gains in achievement but did not appear to cheat, we are able to 
determine the extent to which declines among the high-achieving, suspected cheaters may simply 
be the consequence of mean reversion.  Second, including the control groups allows us to more 
effectively test how various components of our model are working in identifying cheating after the 
fact.  The cost of the retest structure we implemented is that the inclusion of control groups means 
that we are able to retest fewer classrooms suspected of cheating.  Of the 117 classrooms retested, 
                                                 
9.  Indeed, when administering the retest, the proctors are told to emphasize the fact that the 
outcome of the retest will not affect the students in anyway.  These retests are not used to 
determine summer school or magnet school eligibility and are not recorded in a student=s master 
file.  
  13 
76 were suspected of cheating (51 with suspicious strings and large test score gains, 21 with only 
suspicious strings, and 4 anonymous tips).  As noted above, there were many more classrooms that 
looked equally or nearly as suspicious, but were not retested due to resource constraints.10 
In some cases, classrooms were retested on only the math or the reading subject tests, not 
both.11  In particular, classrooms that were suspected of cheating only on math were generally not 
retested on reading.  Classes for which there were anonymous tips were retested only on reading.  
Finally, in the randomly selected control group, either the math or the reading test was 
administered, but never both.  In the results presented below, we only report test score 
comparisons for those subjects on which retests took place. 
 
Section IV: Results of the Retests 
The basic results of the retests are presented in Table 3.  For most of the categories of 
classrooms defined above, six different average test score gains are presented (three each for math 
and reading).12  For the randomly selected classrooms, there is so little data that we lump together 
math and reading.  For the classes identified by anonymous tips, audits took place only on reading 
                                                 
10.  Aware of the overall resource constraints, we provided an initial list of classrooms to CPS 
that had 68, 36, and 25 classrooms in categories 1, 2, and 4 respectively.  Had resources been 
unlimited, more suspected classrooms could have been identified.  Within each category, 
classrooms on our list were not ordered by degree of suspicion.  The choice of which schools to 
retest from our list was made by CPS staff.  In response to resistance on the part of principals at 
heavily targeted schools, a limited number of classrooms were retested at any one school.  In a 
few cases, principals and parents simply refused to allow the retests to be carried out. 
11.  The math portion of the ITBS has three separate sections.  Every class retested on math was 
given all three sections of the math exam, even if the classroom was suspected of cheating on only 
one or two sections of the initial math test.  
12.  Whenever we talk about test score gains, we are referring to the change in test scores for a 
given student, on tests taken at different points in time.  
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so we do not report math scores.  In all cases, we report the test score gains in terms of standard 
score units, the preferred metric of the CPS.  A typical student gains approximately 15 standard 
score units per academic year. 
-----Table 2 about here----- 
In columns 1-3, we report the results on the reading subject test (and the combined reading 
and math test results for the randomly selected classrooms).  Column 1 presents test scores 
between Spring 2001 and the Spring 2002 ITBS (the actual test, not the retest).  Among all 
classrooms in CPS (both those that are retested and those that are not), the average gain on the 
reading test was 14.3 standard score points.  Classrooms a priori identified as most suspicious 
achieved gains almost twice as large, that is students in these classes tested roughly two grade 
equivalents higher than they had in the previous year.  Our control group of good teachers achieved 
gains that were large (20.6), but not as great as the suspected cheaters.  Bad teachers suspected of 
cheating had test score gains slightly above the average CPS classroom.  The randomly selected 
classes were in line with the overall CPS, as would be expected. 
Column 2 shows how the reading test scores changed between the Spring 2002 test and the 
Spring 2002 retest conducted a few weeks later.  The results are striking.  The most likely cheaters 
saw a decline of 16.2 standard score points, or more than a full grade equivalent.  The bad 
teachers suspected of cheating also saw large declines of 8.8 standard score points.  The 
anonymous tip classes lost 6.8 points.  In stark contrast, however, the good teacher classrooms 
actually register small increases on the audit test relative to the original.13  The randomly selected 
classrooms lost 2.3 points, or only one-seventh as much as the most likely cheaters.  The fact that 
                                                 
13.  As noted above, math and reading scores are lumped together for the randomly selected 
classrooms, so the decline of 2.3 reported in column 2 would be applicable here as well.  
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the two control groups (good teachers and randomly selected classes) saw only small declines 
suggests that any impact of decreased effort by students on the retest are likely to be minimal.  The 
much larger decline in scores on the audit test for the suspected cheaters is consistent with the 
hypothesis that their initial reading scores were inflated due to cheating. 
Column 3 reports the gain in test scores between the Spring 2001 ITBS and the Spring 
2002 retest and thus represents an estimate of the “true” gain in test scores, once the 2002 cheating 
is eliminated (the figures in column 3 are simply the sum of column 1 and 2).14    The largest 
“true” gains, as would be expected, are in the classrooms identified as good teachers.  The most 
likely cheater classes that scored so high on the initial test, look merely average in terms of “true” 
gains, suggesting that all of their apparent success is attributable to cheating.  For the bad teacher 
category, once the cheating is stripped away, the reading performance is truly dismal: gains of just 
7.8 standard score points, or little more than half of a grade equivalent in a year.  Classrooms 
identified through anonymous tips experienced some declines on the retest, but continued to score 
well above average. 
 Columns 4-6 report results parallel to the first three columns, but for math instead of 
reading.  The results are generally similar to those for reading, but less stark.15  The good teachers 
                                                 
14.  Subject to the caveat that effort might have been lower on the retest and that the Spring 2001 
scores might themselves be inflated by cheating that occurred in the prior year. 
15.  A partial explanation for why the results on the math test are less stark than those for reading 
is that the math test is made up of three separate parts, unlike reading, which is in one self-
contained section.  In conducting the retests, classrooms suspected of cheating on any of the three 
math sections were retested on the entire math test.  Thus, included in the math results are some 
classes where there was strong evidence of cheating on one part of the math exam, but not on  
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have baseline math gains commensurate with the most likely cheaters (column 4), which was not 
true in reading.  The results of the audit tests in column 5 once again show large declines for the 
two categories of classrooms suspected of cheating (over 10 standard score point declines in each 
case).  The good teacher classrooms also see a small decline in math scores on the retest (3.3 
standard score points), unlike on reading where they gained.  Finally, in column 6, a notable 
difference between the results for reading and math is that the classrooms a priori judged most 
likely to be cheating showed above average “true” gains on math, which was not the case for 
reading.  This result is likely due to the fact that our modified algorithm used for prospectively 
identifying cheaters relies in part on large test score gains, and thus is biased towards identifying 
classrooms that have large real gains.  (In contrast, the retrospective algorithm used to assess 
teacher cheating in our earlier published work is specifically designed to be neutral in this regard. 
 Without access to the next year’s test scores, however, this neutrality is lost).  In other words, the 
false positives generated by the prospective algorithm are likely to be concentrated among 
classrooms with large true gains.16 
Figures 2 and 3 present the cumulative distribution of changes in test scores between the 
initial Spring 2002 test and the retest for classrooms in different categories for reading and math 
                                                                                                                                                             
another part.  Even when the math results are further disaggregated, identifying particular sections 
of the math exam where classes were a priori judged likely to have cheated, the results are not as 
clean as for reading. 
16.  Alternatively, it could just be that good teachers are also more likely to cheat.  We are 
skeptical of this hypothesis since Jacob and Levitt (forthcoming), using our retrospective measure, 
finds cheating to be concentrated in the lowest achieving schools and classrooms.  
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respectively.  These figures highlight the stark differences between the classes a priori predicted 
to be cheating and those identified as good teachers.  The vertical axis is the cumulative percent of 
classrooms with a test score change between the initial test and the audit that is less than the value 
named on the horizontal axis.  Three separate cumulative distributions are plotted in each figure 
corresponding to the a priori most suspicious classrooms, bad teachers suspected of cheating, and 
good teachers.  The striking feature of the figures is how little overlap there is between the 
cheating and good teacher distributions.  In Figure 2, the worst outcome for the most suspicious 
classrooms was a decline of 54 points (roughly three grade equivalents).  Many classes in this 
category experienced very large losses.  The bad teachers suspected of cheating did not have a 
long left tail like the most suspicious cheaters, but had a high concentration of cases in which there 
were double-digit losses.  In contrast, the single biggest test score decline experienced by a good-
teacher classroom on reading is seven standard points (as indicated by the cumulative distribution 
rising above zero at that point for the good teacher curve).  More than eighty percent of the most 
suspicious classrooms experienced losses greater than that, and almost 60 percent of bad teacher 
classrooms saw bigger declines.  Note also that about one-third of the good teacher classrooms 
experienced test score gains, whereas virtually none of the suspected cheating classrooms did. 
-----Figure 2 about here----- 
The results in Figure 3 are similar.  The primary differences between the two figures are 
that (1) the distribution of outcomes for the most suspicious teachers and the bad teachers 
suspected of cheating are almost identical on the math test, and (2) the gap between the good 
teachers and the suspected cheaters is not quite as pronounced.  Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that 
the differences in means presented in Table 2 are not driven by a few outliers, but rather represent 
systematic differences throughout the entire distribution.  One implication of these findings is that  
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our methods not only provide a means of potentially identifying cheating classrooms, but also, they 
are at least as successful in identifying classrooms with good teachers whose gains are legitimate 
and are possibly deserving of rewards, as well as focused analysis as examples of best 
practices.17 
-----Figure 3 about here ----- 
Thus far, we have focused exclusively on the classroom as the unit of analysis.  Another 
question of interest is the extent to which cheating tends to be clustered in particular schools, and if 
so, why?18  Unfortunately, the way in which the audits were implemented limit the amount of light 
we are able to shed on this issue.  The CPS officials who determined which classrooms to audit 
intentionally tried to avoid retesting large numbers of classes in individual schools due to the 
negative reaction that elicits in the schools.  There are at least two schools, however, in which the 
                                                 
17. Although some caution must be exercised in discussing “good” teachers.  Are findings suggest 
that classrooms with big test score gains that do not have suspicious answer string patterns can 
maintain their gains on retests.  Whether the large test score gains are the result of artificially low 
test scores in the prior year (due perhaps to a previous bad teacher or adverse test conditions in 
the preceding year) is not something we have explored. 
 
18. Possible explanations include cheating by central administration, explicit collusion by corrupt 
teachers (teachers generally do not proctor their own students during the exam, so cooperation of 
other teachers aids in cheating), a school environment/culture that encourages cheating, or 
systematic differences in incentives across schools (e.g. because low performing schools are 
threatened with probation and reconstitution).  
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audits provide systematic evidence of centralized cheating likely to have been perpetrated by 
school administrators.  These cases are currently under investigation by CPS.  More generally, 
however, it appears that the bulk of the cheating incidents are consistent with teachers rather than 
administrators doing the cheating. 
 
Section V: Using the retests to evaluate and improve cheating detection 
  Up to this point, the paper has focused on evaluating how effective the methods previously 
developed were in prospectively identifying cheaters.  The retest also provides a unique 
opportunity for refining the cheating detection algorithm.  In developing the algorithm we made a 
number of relatively arbitrary functional form and weighting assumptions, which can be tested 
using the data generated by the retests. 
  Our measure of how suspicious a classroom’s answer strings are is based on an average of 
that class’s rank on each of the four different indicators discussed earlier.  Each of the four 
indicators is given equal weight in the algorithm.  Moreover, although greater weight is given to 
variation in the right-hand tail of the distribution of each measure, the weighting function (squaring 
the ranks) used was chosen somewhat arbitrarily.  Using the results of the retest, we are able to 
test the validity of these assumptions by estimating regressions of the form: 
Change_ in_test_scorecs = Suspicious_string_measurescs’G+ ?s + ?g      (1) 
where the left-hand-side variable is the change in test score between the initial Spring 2002 test 
and the audit for  a given classroom c on subject s.  The primary right-hand-side variables of 
interest are the suspicious string measures, which will be entered in a variety of different ways to 
test the predictive ability of alternative functional form and weighting assumptions.  The unit of 
observation in the regression is a classroom-subject test.  Subject- and grade-fixed effects are  
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included in all specifications.  The four different subject tests (reading comprehension and three 
math tests) are pooled together and estimated jointly.  In some cases, we also include the gain 
between the Spring 2001 and Spring 2002 ITBS tests as a control for possible mean reversion on 
the retest.  The suspiciousness of a classroom’s answers on other subject tests on the same exams 
is also sometimes included as a covariate in the model.  The standard errors are clustered at the 
classroom level to account for within classroom correlation across different exams. 
  It is important to note that the sample of classrooms for which we have retest data (and thus 
can estimate equation 1) is a highly selected one in which extreme values of suspicious answer 
strings are greatly overrepresented.  On the one hand, this is desirable, because the parameters are 
being identified from the part of the distribution that has many cheaters.  On the other hand, it is 
possible that the inference from this select sample will be misleading if applied out of sample to 
the whole set of classrooms.  When thinking about how to improve our algorithm’s prospective 
ability to identify cheaters, that latter (potentially misleading) exercise is precisely what we have 
in mind.  So some caution is warranted. 
  The first column of Table 3 presents the results using the overall measure of suspicious 
strings that we developed in our initial paper.  To aid in interpretation, we use a simple 
framework in which we use two indicator variables corresponding to whether a classrooms is in 
the 99
th percentile on this measure, or between the 90
th and 99
th percentiles.  We have 
experimented with a fuller parameterization, but this sparse specification appears to adequately 
capture the relevant variation.  Classrooms in the 99
th percentile on the overall measure of 
suspicious strings on average lose 14.2 standard score points (about one grade equivalent) on the 
retest relative to the omitted category (classes below the 90
th percentile).  This result is highly 
statistically significant.  Classes in the 90
th-98
th percentiles lose only one-third as much, although  
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the result is still statistically significant.19  Thus, there appears to be a sharp discontinuity 
occurring in the last one percent of the distribution.  In the sample used to estimate this regression, 
we can explain almost half of the variation in the retest results using these two variables alone. 
-----Table 3 about here----- 
  Column 2 adopts a different functional form for the suspicious answer strings measure.  
Rather than aggregating over the four different indicators, we count the number of individual 
indicators for which a classroom is in the 99
th percentile, or alternatively, the 90
th percentile.  
Relative to the first column, the second column emphasizes classrooms that look very extreme on 
particular measures (although possibly not extreme at all on other ones) relative to classrooms that 
are somewhat elevated on all four measures.  Being in the 99
th percentile on all four measures 
individually – a very extreme outcome – is associated with a decline of 21.1 points on the retest 
relative to the omitted category which is below the 90
th percentile on all four measures. While 
there is a large jump between being in the 99
th percentile on all four measures versus on three of 
four (-21.1 compared to -11.3), the marginal impact of an extra indicator above the 99
th percentile 
is about 4 standard score points otherwise.  Having one test score above the 90
th percentile (but 
below the 99
th) is associated with as great a decline in test scores as having one test above the 99
th 
percentile, but there is no incremental impact of having two or three measures above the 90
th 
percentile.  Note that the explanatory power of the specification is substantially higher than that of 
the first column, although this is in part due to the greater degrees of freedom in the model. 
                                                 
19. If one allows the impact of 90th-94th percentile to differ from 95th-98th, one cannot reject that 
the coefficients are identical on those two variables.  Indeed, the point estimate on 90th-94th is 
slightly larger than that on 95th-98th.  
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  Further evidence of the usefulness of including the additional detail provided by the model 
in column 2 is presented in column 3 which nests the models of the preceding two specifications.  
The coefficients on the aggregate measure in the first two rows fall to less than half their previous 
magnitude and only for the 99
th percentile variable is the estimate statistically different than zero.  
In contrast, the indicator variables for the separate measures continue to enter strongly and with a 
similar pattern as before.  The R-squared of the nested model in colum 3 is only slightly above that 
of column 2.  These results suggest that our initial approach to aggregating the information in the 
original paper (along the lines of column 1) is less effective in predicting outcomes than the 
alternative presented in column 2.   
  When the suspiciousness of answer strings on other parts of the exam are added to the 
specification (column 4), the results are not greatly affected.  Observing suspicious answers on the 
remainder of the test is predictive of greater test declines on the audit, although the magnitude of 
the effect is relatively small.  Even having all four indicators above the 99
th percentile on all three 
of the other subject tests (compared to none of the indicators above the 90
th percentile on an of the 
other subjects) is associated with only a 5 point test score decline on the audit.   Thus, while 
pooling information across subject areas is somewhat useful in identifying cheating, it is much less 
potent than is the information contained in the answer strings to the actual subject test. 
  Columns 5-8 replicate the specifications of the first four columns, but with the baseline test 
score gain from Spring 2001 to Spring 2002 included as a regressor.  In most cases, the results are 
somewhat attenuated by the inclusion of this variable, which enters significantly negative with a 
coefficient of roughly -.20.  The general conclusions, however, are unaltered.20 
                                                 
20.  We are guarded in our interpretation of this coefficient and these specifications in general,  
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  The specifications in Table 3 give equal treatment to each of the four suspicious string 
measures.  Table 4 relaxes that constraint, allowing separate coefficients on each of the measures. 
 Columns 1 and 3 include only indicator variables for being in the 99
th percentile on the different 
measures; columns 2 and 4 also include dummies for the 90
th-98
th percentiles.  The final two 
columns allow for mean reversion.  The striking result is that being in the 99
th percentile on our 
measure of students getting the hard questions right, but the easy questions wrong is much more 
effective in predicting score declines on the retest than are the other three measures.  The implied 
decline of roughly 10 standard score points associated with being above this threshold is about the 
same magnitude as being in the 99
th percentile on all three of the other measures.  The second most 
effective cheating indicator is a high degree of overall correlation across student answers.  
Perhaps surprisingly, identical blocks of answers, which are so visually persuasive, are not 
particularly good predictors of declines on the retest.  This measure is only borderline statistically 
significant, and one cannot reject equality of coefficients between being in the 99
th percentile and 
the 90
th-98
th percentile.  A high variance in the degree of correlation across questions on the test is 
the worst predictor among the four measures.  None of the coefficients on this indicator are 
statistically significant and all of the point estimates are small in magnitude. 
-----Table 4 about here----- 
   The results of Table 4 suggest that our initial formulation of the suspicious string measures, 
which used equal weights for all four indicators, would be improved by placing greater emphasis 
                                                                                                                                                             
however, because in results not presented in the table we obtain a coefficient close to zero on this 
mean reversion variable when we limit the sample to classrooms not suspected of cheating (i.e. 
good teachers and randomly selected controls).   
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on the measure reflecting students getting the hard questions right and the easy ones wrong, and by 
de-emphasizing or eliminating altogether the measure of variance across questions. 
 
Section VI: Conclusions 
  This paper summarizes the results of a unique policy implementation that allowed a 
prospective test of cheating detection tools we had previously developed.  The results of retests 
generally support the validity of these tools for prospectively identifying teacher cheating.  
Classrooms a priori selected as likely cheaters saw dramatic declines in scores on retests, 
whereas classes identified as good teachers and randomly selected classrooms experienced little 
or no decline.  In addition, the availability of the retest data provided a direct test of the methods 
developed, yielding important improvements in the functional form and weighting assumptions 
underlying the algorithm, which should make it even more effective in future applications. 
  On a more practical level, the implementation demonstrated the value of these tools to 
school districts interested in catching cheaters or deterring future cheating.  Out of almost 7,000 
potential classrooms, our methods isolated 70 suspicious classrooms that were retested (as well 
as many more equally suspicious classrooms that were not retested due to budget constraints).  Of 
these seventy, almost all experienced substantial declines on the retest indicative of cheating.  In 
29 classrooms, the test score declines were particularly great (more than one grade-equivalent on 
average across the subjects retested).  CPS staff further undertook further investigation of these 29 
classrooms, including analysis of erasure patterns and on-sight investigations.  Although the 
outcome of disciplinary actions is still in progress at the time of this writing, there is every 
indication that for the first time in recent history, a substantial number of cheating teachers will be 
disciplined for their actions.  If punishment is indeed handed out, then estimating the deterrent  
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effect of this punishment on cheating on next year’s test will be a potentially interesting subject for 
exploration. 
  Although our primary focus has been on the negative outcome of cheating, the positive 
aspect of this algorithm also deserves emphasis.  Using these tools, we were able to identify a set 
of classrooms that made extraordinary test score gains without any indication of cheating.  Without 
our tools, distinguishing between cheaters and outstanding teachers posed a difficult task.  
Consequently, identifying outstanding teachers was a tricky endeavor.  With our algorithm, 
however, we can be almost certain that classrooms that do not have suspicious answer strings 
were not cheating (at least not in ways that lead to test score declines on retests), allowing for a 
system of rewards that will not inadvertently be directed towards cheaters. 
  Explicit cheating of the type we identify is not likely to be a serious enough problem by 
itself to call into question high-stakes testing, both because it is relatively rare (only 1-2 percent of 
classrooms on any given exam) and likely to become much less prevalent with the introduction of 
proper safeguards such as the cheating detection techniques we have developed.  On the other 
hand, our work on cheating highlights the nearly unlimited capacity of human beings to distort 
behavior in response to incentives.  The sort of cheating we catch is just one of many potential 
behavioral responses to high-stakes testing.  Other responses, like teaching to the test and cheating 
in a subtler manner, such as giving the students extra time, are presumably also present, but are 
harder to measure.  Ultimately, the aim of public policy should be to design rules and incentives 
that provide the most favorable tradeoff between the real benefits of high-stakes testing and the 
real costs associated with behavioral distortions aimed at artificially gaming the standard.  
   




Notes: The measure of suspicious answer strings on the horizontal axis is measured in terms of the 
classroom’s rank within its grade, subject and year, with zero representing the least suspicious 
classroom and one representing the most suspicious classroom.  The 95
th percentile cutoff for both 
the suspicious answer strings and test score fluctuation measures.  The results are not sensitive to 
the cutoff used.  The observed points represent averages from 200 equally spaced cells along the 
x-axis.  The predicted line is based on a probit model estimated with seventh order polynomials in 
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Note: Not all classrooms were administered both reading and math tests.  In particular, to conserve resources, each classroom in the 
randomly selected control group was given only one portion of the test (i.e. either reading, or one of the three sections of math).  For the 
other classrooms, either the entire test was administered, just reading, or all three sections of the math exam.  
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Notes: Because of limited data, math and reading results for the randomly selected classrooms are combined.  Only the first two columns 
are available for all CPS classrooms since audits were performed only on a subset of classrooms.  All entries in the table are in 
standard score units.  
   
Table III: The Relationship between Suspicious Answer Strings and Score Declines on the Retest 
 
Measure of suspicious answer strings  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Overall measures of suspicious answer strings  
(omitted category is 1-89
th percentile): 
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Number of individual measures on which class is 
 in 99
th percentile (omitted category is zero): 
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Number of individual measures on which class is 
 in 90
th-98
th percentile (omitted category is zero): 
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Average number of categories in 99
th 
percentile on other  
subjects 
----  ----  ----  -1.3 
(0.6) 
----  ----  ----  -1.5 
(0.6) 
Average number of categories in 90
th-98
th 
percentile on other subjects 
----  ----  ----  -0.8 
(0.5) 
----  ----  ----  -1.0 
(0.6) 
Test score gain, Spring 2001 to Spring 
2002 
 








R-squared  .462  .518  .530    .512  .559  .569  .582 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the mean Standard Score between the Spring 2002 
ITBS and the retest, for students taking both exams.  The sample is the set of classrooms that were 
retested in Spring 2002.  The unit of observation is a classroom-subject.  Sample size is 316.  
Grade-fixed effects and subject-fixed effects are included in all regressions.  Standard errors are 
clustered to take into account correlation within classrooms across different subject tests.  
   
Table IV: The Performance of the Individual Suspicious String Indicators 
in Predicting Score Declines on the Retest 
 
Cheating indicator  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Hard questions right, easy questions wrong         















----  -3.6 
(1.2) 
----  -3.1 
(1.2) 
Identical answer blocks         















----  -2.5 
(1.1) 
----  -1.7 
(1.0) 
High overall correlation across students         















----  -1.8 
(1.0) 
----  -1.6 
(1.0) 
High variance in correlation across questions         















----  0.6 
(1.1) 
----  0.3 
(1.1) 




         
R-squared  .482  .524  .529  .558 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the mean Standard Score between the Spring 2002 
ITBS and the retest, for students taking both exams.  The sample is the set of classrooms that were 
retested in Spring 2002.  The unit of observation is a classroom-subject.  Sample size is 316.  
Grade-fixed effects and subject-fixed effects are included in all regressions.  Standard errors are 
clustered to take into account correlation within classrooms across different subject tests.  
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